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Manufactured in the U. S. A. by H. Wolff, New YoTkTHE INDEX of the nation's economic welfare is the quantity
f goods and services at the disposal of the people. Change
Ti this quantity may be regarded as dependent on the extent
which our industrial system uses more or less labor to
urn out a unit of product and employs a smaller or larger
ggregate labor force. The less labor needed for a unit of
oods the greater is the yield of goods for a given labor
ifort, of course. But this yield alone does not determine
utpqt; for, if aggregate employment declines, even an in-
rease in the product of a given amount of labor may be
ccompanied by stable or falling output. Nor does aug-
riented employment in itself mean a greater flow of goods
nd services, since it may be offset by a decline in the yield
if goods per unit of labor.
Changes in the economy at large, moreover, are the net
esult of changes in the segments that make up the in-
lustrial system, embracing activities as diverse as agricul-
ure, mining, manufacturing, construction, and personal
ervices. Within any one segment, as in the entire economy,
'ariation in output is a function of changes in labor per
mit and in total employment. The complete picture of
:hanges in the entire economy must therefore be a com-
)osite of the diverse changes in output, employment, and
abor per unit within the several segments. A vital part of
his composite consists of the changes in manufacturing,
.o which this paper is confined.
We trace the trends in manufacturing output, employ-
nent, and labor per unit of product since 1899. As factory
)utput was discussed in detail in The Output of Manu-
acturing Industries, 1899_1937,1weconcentrate attention
iere on changes in employment and in its relation to out-
)ut. By output we mean the physical quantity of goods
)roduced, not their pecuniary value. By employment we
nean the average number of workers engaged. Because
:hanges in hours of labor greatly affect the relation between
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940.
3employment and output, we inquire also into changes i
manhours worked, though data are less adequate tha
on workers employed. Chief emphasis is on long-perio
changes during the last four decades; we do not
cyclical movements in detail because for this purpose at
nual data are not fine enough.
CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT
American manufacturing industries gave a livelihood t
five million workers ini 8gg—wage earners, salaried pel
sons, corporate officials, and independent entrepreneur:
constituting about 22 per cent of all persons attached t
industry in that prosperous year. In 1937, the latest pea
year of business preceding the current defense boom an
therefore more comparable with 1899 than are more recen
years, manufacturing absorbed the services of ten millio:
persons, amounting to some 24 per cent of the entire
ing population. In the four decades factory employec
doubled while total employment increased about 85 pe
cent, and the population, about 75 per cent.
The twofold increase in factory jobs did not come abon
through uniform annual increments, but was the net resul
of a series of rises and declines. Unfortunately, we have n
year-to-year record for all types of factory personnel, bu
we do have it for wage earners, who constituted 85 per cen
of all persons engaged in manufacturing in 1937. In thi
large category the number employed declined during a
many as nine intervals after 1899 (Chart i).2 Only one c
these declines lasted more than a year, that from 1929 t
1932, which brought wage-earner employment to a poiti
almost 40 per cent below the 1929 average and 20 per cer
below the low levels of 1921 and 1914. Fewer wage earnei
were employed in factories in 1932 than during any ca
endar year for more than a generation.
2 Figures supporting all the charts except the fifth appear in Tables tand
More details will be presented in the volume on which this paper is base
4The iow level of factory employment in 1952 reflects
both its failure to grow during the 1920'S and the severe
decline after 1929. The annual record, 1899—1937, shows
that the entire twofold increase was during the first two
decades, the fastest rate being between 1913 and 1918. The
demand for munitions and other manufactured goods
consumed in military and naval operatiOns helped to raise
factory employment in i 918 to a peak that was not surpassed
in 1923, 1929, or 1937—all prosperous years. During the
major portion of the first two decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, apparently, many of the youths and immigrants enter-
ing the American labor market found opportunity for em-
ployment in factories; but during the 1920's and 1930's
CHARTI
All Manufacturing Industries Combined
Indexes of Physical Output, Wage Earners
Employed, and Total Employed






300there were openings only for those needed to replace the
workers who left or were forced out of this branch of our
industry. With factory employment in 1941 well above that
in any preceding year, it is clear that the present defense
program has radically altered the picture, though for how
long we cannot as yet say.
The course of factory employment takes on added inter-
est when contrasted with factory output. During shorter
intervals there were, of course, similar cyclical fluctuations
in each (Chart i), but when successive peaks are compared,
we find that employment and output diverged more or less
progressively. In only two periods, 1913—18and1929—37,
were the net changes in output and in employment equal.
In the other periods output expanded from peak to peak
more rapidly than employment or expanded while employ-
ment contracted. Especially noteworthy is the continued
growth of factory output during the 1920'S to heights well
above those of igi6—i8. Not until 1941 did factory employ-
ment surpass the levels of those war years.
THE NET DECLINE IN LABOR PER UNIT OF PRODUCT
Perhaps the most striking figure in this paper defines the
decline in factory workers employed per unit of product
from 1899 to '937. For the aggregate of all manufacturing
lindustries, large and small, advanced and laggard, labor
per unit of product was cut in half. The processed goods
turned out in 1899 required 5 million factory workers; in
1937 four times the goods were produced by only twice as
many factory workers.
Formidable though a cut of one-half is, it probably under-
states the actual decline in the employment-output ratio.
The 1937 output was, on the average, of better quality than
commodities manufactured at the opening of the century.
Further, from what we know concerning the reduction in
waste and the utilization of byproducts we may infer that
6ess raw material went into a unit of output than in
wecould take account of these changes, we would prob-
tbiy conclude that our estimate that one-half as many
workers turned out a given quantity of goods in 1937as
vere required in 1899 was too high.
Labor per unit of product declined more drastically
:han even such a refined figure, if we had it, would imply;
the decrease in factory workers employed per unit was
iccompanied by a very considerable drop in weekly hours
)f labor. A full-time week fell from an average of about 6o
E-iours per person in 1899 to about 40 hours in 1937.The
upshot of halving the number of workers per unit of prod-
uct and cutting hours a third is a drop of two-thirds in
aggregate manhours per unit. In short, by 1937 only about
one-third as many manhours of factory work went into the
fabrication of a given quantity of goods as 38 years earlier.
This enormous decline in labor per unit reflects a trans-
formation in manufacturing techniques, and different con-
ditions of work, intensity of labor effort, and material means
of production. The industrialist of 1900wouldrub his eyes
in amazement were he suddenly set down in the United
States of 1940.Hewould see new materials, more and bigger
machines, novel and flexible sources of power, giant fac-
tories and industries, more efficient mechanical, chemical,
and electrical processes, assembly lines speeding the flow of
work, intensified division of labor, revised methods of labor
management. These and a host of other things made for
economy in factory labor per unit of product.
Some changes may be defined quantitatively. For ex-
ample, between 1904(theearliest year for which we have
data) and 1937,thenet book value of capital assets used in
manufacturing rose from about $6 billion to almost $25
3 Thatis, the net output of manufacturing industries rose more rapidly
than their gross output, because of a slower rise in the input of materials.
For a discussion of the bias that characterizes indexes of physical output,
when they are taken to represent net output, see The Output of Manu fat-
turing Industries, .r899—1937, Ch. 2.
7billion, or from about $1,000of•capital assets per worke
to over $2,000.Priceincreases between 1904and1937 mus
account for a good portion, but even after allowing fo
them, so far as we can, we get an increase of at least 30pe
cent in the net value of capital instruments per worker
Again, the aggregate rated horsepower capacity of prim
movers and of electric motors driven by purchased
in manufacturing plants rose from io million
in 1899 to over 50millionin 1989, or at a rate two and
hilf times that at 'Which employment in factories advanced
The expansion in the scale of industrial operations, Witi
all that it implies in respect of intensified specialization o
industries, plants, and labor, is measured roughly by thd
almost fourfold expansion in output itself.
Though statistics on these and other changes may
readily cited, there are direct or precise measures for few
The shortening of the work-week is a factor making fo:
greater efficiency of labor, but the one-third decline ii
hours is hardly ah adequate index. The elimination, it
large part; of the child labor employed in 1899 is anothe:
factor, but it too is difficult to weigh. Furthermore,
of the changes, such as revisions of plant layout, ate qualita
tive. Tncommensurable and differing vastly in degree anc
kind, their total effect is hard to grasp. The ratio of laboi
inpht to units of output is itself perhaps the simplest anc
most readily computed single index of all these changes,
large and small. Whether appraised in terms of men 01
ofmanhours, the decline in this ratio is the most
measure.
Because the reduction in labor per unit of product
many diverse changes, it cannot be taken as a measure ol
change in the efficiency, amount, or character of any orn
production factor. Those who consider the figures cited ix
be indexes of labor efficiency or of invested capital and im
provement in capital equipment are, in fact, ascribing t
one or an9ther factor in a complex situation the net resuli
8of changes in all factors. Nor is it justifiable to focus atten-
Lion exclusively on any one motivating force behind the far-
reaching changes measured by the decline .in labor per unit.
If we stress management as theit initiator we may under-
estimate the other factors that must have stimulated man-
agement: for example, trade union efforts to raise wage
rates and encouragement by governmental agencies! of
standardization of products and regulation of hours and
labor conditions. Sometimes, of course, a specific change in
labor per unit may be accurately ascribed to some single
fattor; but this is not true of changes in broad industrial
categories during long periods. Even all factors of manu-
facturing production considered together may not be
given the entire credit or responsibility for the changes in
manufacturing. They do not function in a vacuum, for
manufacturing is but a part of the integrated economy, as
we note in' the final section of this paper.
INDUSTRIAL 'DIFFERENCES IN THE CHANGE IN LABOR PER UNIT
The impact of the factors making for reductions in labor per
unit of product has not been the same on all manufacturing
industries. For this reason, as we would expect, the averages
for all minufacturirig industries combined conceal wide dif-
ferences. In some industries merely minor declines or even
increases occurred in the labor-output ratio, in others, pre-
cipitate drops.
In 8 of the 50 industries for which there is information
covering the period 1899—1 937, workers per unit of product
decreased 70 per cent or more (Chart 2). Heading the list is
automobile manufacture (with an 88, per cent decline), fol-
lowed by industries as diverse as beet sugar, silk and rayon
goods, industrial chemicals, and blast-furnace products. At
the bottom of the list are 8 industries in which the employ-
ment-output ratio rose:in the field •of transportation
equipment (railroad cars, locomotives, and ships), as well as
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I #tn-ntntnntnnn#ranntaaan,and 2 small textile industries (linen goods and wool-felt
hats).
The indexes of manhours per unit, too, vary from indus-
try to industry in the rate of change, although in all except
one of the industries covered by separate indexes, they de-
clined. The exception is locomotive manufacture, one of the
eight industries in which employees per unit of output rose.
As for the other seven, when labor is measured in terms of
manhours instead of men, we find that they too are to be
classed with the industries in which labor per unit of
product was cut.
Locomotives improved substantially in quality and in-
creased greatly in size. No doubt the industry's exceptional
position in Chart 2 is to be attributed in some degree to our
inability to take statistical account of these
asimilar explanation applies to some of the
other industries that lagged in reducing labor per unit of
output. Perhaps more important, these industries either
failed to expand their output between 1899and1937(even
with liberal allowance for quality changes) or actually cur-
tailed it. On the other hand, the industries at the head of the
list usually expanded output faster than the average. This
interesting relation is considered in detail in a subsequent
section.4
In many industries, aggregate manhours worked declined
very rapidly in relation to goods produced. The two-thirds
drop in the ratio for total manufacturing in the 38 years
means that each year, on the average, manhours per unit de-
clined 2.7 per cent. In many industries the per annum rates
are phenomenal. For example, in the automobile industry it
was g per cent; in tobacco manufacture, 7 per cent; and in
4Anotherpossible explanation of increase or slow decline in labor per unit
is, of course, inaccuracy of the underlying Census data. (This affects all the
indexes in Chart 2,notonly those at the bottom of the list) No statistics are
perfectly accurate, but there is no evidence of any bias on this account that
need worry us.
11silk and rayon goods, blast-furnace products, and industrial
chemicals, 5 per cent. Reductions in the manhour-output
ratio of i o, 15, or 20 per cent were a matter of a few years, not
of decades, as is attested by the cumulative effect of these
rates of decline: an average annual decline ofper cent in
the manhour-output ratio amounts in three years to 14 per
cent. As we shall see in the next section, in some periods the
annual rate was well above the average. Evidently, impor-
tant changes often took place within the span of a single
business cycle.
FLUCTUATIONS IN THE RATE OF DECLINE IN LABOR PER UNIT
Halving the ratio of employees to output in all factories
combined is the net result of four decades of change. On ten
occasions, as the year-to-year record in Chartshows, the
CHART3
AllManufacturing Industries Combined
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1899 1909 1919 1929 1939
12downward trend was reversed and more, rather than fewer,
workers were ethployed per unit of output. Besides these
cyclical fluctuations there were more persistent tendencies
in the rate of decline in the ratio. By comparing low points
several years apart in the chart, one observes that for all fac-
tories combined the employment-output ratiO tended to
movC horizontally or to rise during three periods: it did not
fall below the low point touched in 1906 until 1912, below
the low of 1916 until 1922, or below the low of 1929 until
1936. On the other hand, the declines between the lows of
and 1916, and between those of 1922 and 1929 were
especially rapid.5
Changes in hours must have contributed to these, fluctua-
tions. The manhour-output ratios are much, more stable
from year to year than the employment-output ratios; 6and
while they are characterized by a roughly similar sequence
5Thoseinterested particularly in the period after should be warned
that, owing to revisions of the Census schedules, the Census understates the
number of factory workers in The understatement is slight for 1935
and1937; for 1939,however,it may perhaps be as much as 5 per cent; see
the notes to Table 1.
6 Itshould not be assumed that the effect of changcs in hours on the labor-
output ratio is segregated when labor is measured in manhours rather
in men. The effect is reduced, not removed, for changes in hours influence
even the manhour-output ratio. Such an influence is exerted in several ways
worth brief mention to indicate how complex the relations are.
The ratio may decline as an immediate and direct effect of greater labor
efficiency, for workers putting in 50ø1 Gohours a week work at a slower
pace than those employed go or 40hours.Indirectly, the ratio may decline
through revisions in organization and techniques which are usually stimu-
lated by changes in the length of the work week and the changes in the level
of wage rates frequently associated with them. The net 'effect of changes in
hours remains, of course, exceedingly difficult to measure, for it depends not
only on their amount but also on the initial level of hours, the number and
kind of concomitant managerial and technical innovations, and other
elements in the situation. For example, a reduction of weekly hours from
6o tomay be expected to have a more marked effect on labor efficiency
than from a permanent reduction in the work week during a
period of prosperity will have an influence different from that of a work-
sharing program instituted during a depression.
13of rapid and slow decline (note the slow rate of decline
during 1907—10, 1914—20, and 1930—38, as compared with
contiguous periods), the alterations in their rate of decline
are less pronounced. Indeed, the most striking revelation of
Chart 3 is the persistence with which manhours per unit de-
clined. Unfortunately, we do not know enough about actual
hours worked per week to describe the movement during
the entire period since 1899. For some years we have no in-
formation, and for a few other years the data are rather in-
consistent, as can be inferred from the divergence between
the two estimates of manhour-output during the early i 930'S
(Chart 3).7 Yet it is safe to say that in only a few of the years
since the turn of the century did no reduction in the man-
hour-output ratio occur.
Interestingly enough, capital investment, considered one
of the chief factors making for reductions in unit labor re-
quirements, has fluctuated rather violently, apparently with-
out any noteworthy or even consistent effects on short-time
changes in the manhour-output ratio. The ratio dropped
sharplyfrom 1920 to 1921 andagain from 1929 to 1931, yet
capital investment by manufacturers fell in both periods,
in the latter to a level actually below current depreciation
charges. But during another period when manhours per
unit were declining rapidly, 192 3—29, capital investment re-
mained at a high level. It is surprising, also, that 1936—37
are among the few years in which there was no appreciable
decline in manhours per unit, for capital investment rose to
heights comparable with those of the 1920'S.
One explanation lies in the difference between the cur-
rent flow of capital and changes in the existing stock of
capital assets. Even violent fluctuations in new investment
cause relatively mild changes in assets; and capital assets do
not actually decline until new investment becomes too small
7Thereis little choice between the two estimates for the period prior to
1932.Forthe later period, however, Estimate B is to be preferred since it is
based on a superior sample of data on hours per week.
14to offset depreciation charges. Yet through changes in the
quantity and character of assets alone can fluctuations in in-
vestment influence directly the labor-output ratio.8 And if a
period of adaptation (for reorganization or breaking-in) is
necessary, the ratio does not react immediately even to fluc-
tuations in assets.9
Also contributing to an explanation of the relatively mild
fluctuations in labor per unit—despite large fluctuations in
capital investment—is the removal from service of less effi-
cient equipment as output (and with it new investment)
contracts, and its return when output (and new investment)
expands. Equipment set aside and then brought back into
use presumably requires more manhours per unit of output
than equipment kept continuously in use. The alternation
of use and disuse of the less efficient equipment helps to off-
set the influence of fluctuations in new investment upon the
labor-output ratio.
The net effect of the influences noted in the preceding
paragraphs is difficult to assess. Variation in the degree to
which they balance one another may help to explain the in-
consistent relations between capital investment and the
manhour-output ratio. But it is hardly likely that they are
alone. There are also modifications in relevant factors other
than capital investment and the efficiency of the equipment
in actual use: in the quality and character of products as
prices fall and rise; in managerial efficiency with recession
and recovery; and in labor efficiency as unemployment con-
8Changesin investment have indirect effects on the ratio through their in-
fluence on the national output. This chain of relationships is too complex
to trace here.
9Evenmild fluctuations in the book value of capital assets may be more
violent than concomitant fluctuations in the gross book value of assets (be-
fore deduction of depreciation reserves); yet the latter is even more closely
related than the former to changes in the capital stock conceived of in some
physical sense—which is the relevant sense when we consider shifts in labor
per unit. We cannot say anything definite about gross value of assets because
data are lacking.
15tracts or expands, as hours of labor are cut or lengthened,
and as labor organization waxes and wanes. These and other
changes, some peculiar to single periods!, others occurring in
many business cycles, must be analyzed before we can under-
stand why the labor-input ratio for all manufacturing indus-
tries combined behaves as it does during short periods.
It is conceivable that the cyclical fluctuations in the ratios
for individual manufacturing industries are much more con-
sistent in behavior and extreme in amplitude than the ratio
for all factories combined. The average hides the diverse
movemexits characterizing individual industries, and these
may cancel one another more completely in some cycles than
in others, depending on the shifting relative importance of
each industry in the total.'° The evidenée collected in this
study does no more than suggest that there is some industrial
diversity of cyclical pattern and that in a few industries there
is a fairly considerable amplitude of fluctuation, although
here too the general impression is one of gradual decline
rather than of considerable variation about a downward
trend.. Our statistics tell us little about the consistency of the
cycles in labor-output in individual industries. To study
these fluctuations we need better and more extensive
monthly data.
EMPLOYMENT IN RELATION TO OUTPUT AND TO UNIT LABOR
REQUIREMENTS IN INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRIES
In manufacturing as a whole a reduction in the number of
workers engaged in producing a unit of output was
panied in some periods by an expansion in total employ-
ment and in others by a contraction. That is, no consistent
relation between the ratio and the aggregate is discernible
when all manufacturing industries are lumped together.
When we examine the component branches, however, cer-
10Shiftsin the relative importance of individual industries will affect the
aggregate labor-output ratio also if they are correlated with the absolute
levels of labor per dollar of value added in the various industries.tamrelations between long-time changes in the two emerge,
as well as between them and changes in output.11
First, as might have been expected, there has been a high
degree of correlation between trends in output and in num-
ber of workers (Chart 4).12Thebiggest increases between
1899and1937inboth employment and output were in the
industry assembling motor vehicles. Other industries ivith
large increases in both are industrial chemicals (including
also rayon and compressed gases), petroleum refining, beet
sugar, and canned fruits and vegetables. Declines or small
increases in employment have usually occurred in those in-
dustries in which output also has lagged or declined. Among
the industries laggard in both respects are those producing
carriages and wagons (with declines of 95 and 96 per cent in
output and employment, respectively), railroad locomotives,
lumber-mill products, flour, and chewing and smoking to-
bacco. To be sure, some of these industries greatly improved
the quality of their products, but even if these improve-
ments could be taken into, account it is unlikely that the
conclusions would have to be altered
Another set of relationships. stands out rather vividly in
Chart 4.Thebars representing declines in the employment-
output 'ratios shrink from left to right, just as do the bars
that stand for changes in output and employment. That is,
for the period as a whole the industries with greater-than-
average increases in both employment and output tended to
have exceptionally large declines in employment per unit,
ii.Asstated earlier, we measure employment by the average number of
workers on the payroll. For the present purpose, data on hours of labor per
week are inadequate, precluding discussion of trends in aggregate man-
hours. What data we have indicate clearly, however, that reductions in the
working week have been widespread and that they have not been correlated
with trends in the number employed. The reader may therefore safely assume
that the discussion of employment, in terms of men, applies equally well on
the average to manhours, except that the trend in the latter is less steep.
12Thecoefficient of rank correlation between percentage changes, 1899-.
1937,inoutput and employment in the 50industrieslisted in Chart 4 is .8g.
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26 27 28 29 30 3132 33 34 35 36 373839 40 43 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 4950•and those with less-than-average increases in both tended to
have declines in employment per unit that also were less
than average.'3 Jobs per unit of product fell most precipi-
tately in the automobile industry and, as we have just. seen,
this industry is to be credited also with the largest expan-
sions in both total employment and output. Again, in indus-
trial chemicals total employment increased 690 per cent,
and output, 2,500 per cent, with a consequent decline of 70
per cent in employment per unit of output; therefore, it
stands close to the top in all three respects. In lumber mills,
on the other hand, employment per unit increased 19 per
cent; at the same time total employment decreased 20 per
cent and output 32 per cent. We may conclude then that
when output expands rapidly, even a substantial decrease in
the men employed per unit may not be, and in the past
usually has not been, accompanied by fewer jobs in an indus-
try. H output expands only moderately, however, a decline
in the ratio of men employed to units produced usually
means rather slow growth in jobs in an industry, and some-
times actually fewer jobs. On the other hand, an increase in
workers employed per unit has not necessarily meant more
jobs in an industry, for frequently output was meanwhile
curtailed.
So far we have considered relations among the average
rates of change in employment, output, and the employ-
ment-output ratio, during a specific period, 1899—1937.We
now turn to these relations during the successive stages
through which an industry passes. For obviously all indus-
tries were not in the same phase of development during
13Thecoefficient of rank correlation between percentage changes, 1899—1997,
in output and employment per unit is —.74 between changes in employ.
ment and employment per unit, —.29.Muchlower than the former, the lat-
ter coefficient seems just barely significantly different from zero. However,
whatever errors there may be in the basic data would in themselves tend to
cause a positive correlation between changes in employment and employ-
ment per unit and a negative correlation between changes in output and
employment per unit.
20these years—some were coming into being, some were reach-
ing their prime, some were already on the way out.
The development of an industry, in terms of output, pro-
ceeds at a rate that diminishes more or less steadily. from
decade to decade, until, when peak output is attained, it be-
comes zero, then negative.'4 The course of retardation in
manufacturing is especially notable in the automobile in-
dustry. Its output grew less rapidly during the second dçcade
of the century than during the first, less rapidly during the
third than during the second, and less rapidly during the
fourth than during the third (Chart 5). Other
with marked and fairly uniform rates of retardation in
growth of output are those producing flour, ice, cigars, chew-
ing and smoking tobacco, and carriages.
Similarly, employment grows at a decelerating rate. Just
as output in most industries has tended to expand less and
less rapidly with the passage of time, so the percentage
crease in employment has usually diminished. Reductions
in hours of labor have modified this pattern, but have not
radically altered its general outline.
Retardation of growth in both output and the number
employed does not mean, of course, that the graph of em-j
ployment is superimposed exactly on that of output or that
the shapes of the graphs are identical. Because of wide-
spread and more or less persistent declines in employment
per unit of product, the growth in aggregate employment
in any one period is usually slower than in output; and
maximum peaks in employment frequently precede maxi-
mum peaks in output. Among 55 industries in which trends
in both employment and output have been downward since
1929orearlier, in only 4 has the peak in employment fbl-
lowed the peak in output. In 17, mainly because of cyclical
and random fluctuations impressed on both, the two dates
14Thispattern was established by Arthur F. Burns not only for manufac.
turing but for industry in general; see his Production Trends in the United
States since 1870 (National Bureau of Economic Research,1934), Ch. IV.













































































































































































































































































Ratio scalecoincide. In the other 34 industries, over half of the sample,
employment reached a peak and began to recede while out-
put was still expanding; and in as many as io of these,
output reached its peak more than a decade later than em-
ployment. It is likely that annual data would show an even
greater proportion of industries with the highest peak in
employment preceding the highest peak in output, and that
the highest peak in manhours would lead the highest peak
in output in a proportion of industries greater than 34 out
of 55, and that the average lead of the manhour peak over
the output peak would be longer than the average lead of
the employment peak over the output peak.
Against this background of growth and decline in indi-
vidual industries we may re-examine certain conclusions
brought out in analyzing employment and output during
the four decades. Employment moves in the same direction
as output, but not as that of employment per unit, during
the early stages of an industry's career; during the middle
stages its movement corresponds in direction with employ-
ment per unit rather than with output; and during the
late stages all three tend to follow the same direction. In
young industries, whose output characteristically shoots up
quickly, the enormous gains usually more than counter-
balance the declining trend frequent in the labor-output
ratio; as a consequence, employment too expands, usually
rather rapidly. During the mature phase of an industry out-
put expands slowly, if at all, and the gain is usually more
than counterbalanced by the declining trend in the labor-
output ratio; as a result jobs decrease with employment per
unit of product, unless the length of the working week is
reduced sufficiently to offset the decline in the latter. In old
and waning industries, falling output offers no counterpoise
to diminishing labor requirements per unit, and even sub-
stantial cuts in the hours of work per week fail to halt
reductions in the number employed.
These conclusions are based in part on the decline corn-
27mon in the ratio of labor utilized to goods produced during
all stages of an industry. If changes in the working week
could be taken into account, few of the apparent exceptions
to'rule would remain.
It is amusing to consider how these conclusions would
have to be modified if it were found that the labor-output
ratio not only shrinks but does so at a rate that follows some
general pattern from' stage to stage. The most interesting
possibility is that the rate 'of decline diminishes from stage
to stage.'5 If unit labor requirements do shrink at a de-
celerating rate, the most precipitate drops' must ciccur in
precisely the stages at 'which output is expanding most
rapidly; and since the pace of the latter much more than
counterbalances the shrinkage in the former, the number
employed mounts most Irapidly in the same period. And
again, the change in labor per unit becomes less and less
noticeable just when employment is expanding only slowly
or actually receding, for in this period output is either lag-
ging' behind that of most other industries or definitely
sagging. One would have to conclude, if deceleration of
change in unit labor requirements is a fact, that employ-
ment usually expands most rapidly when re4uctions in
labor per unit in an industry are most drastic, and that em-
ployrnent. exp4nds least rapidly or diminishes when the
industry has ceased to reduce labor per unit substantially.
This conclusion could be true yet unimportant. It is pos-
sible, for example, that deceleration of the rate of change
in the labor-output ratio, even if it exists, takes the form,
15Someauthors have explained retardation of growth in output in 'part by
the slowing down of tçchnical progress, which implies, of course, a slacken-
ing in the rate of decline in labor per unit. (See the evidence of a slackening
in the' rate of technical progress in the cotton, woolen and worsted, iron and
steel, shoe, paper, and copper industries, in Simon Kuznets, Secular Move-
ments in Production and Prices; Houghton' Muffin, 'gao, Ch. I.)Such a
slackening should also be expected if unit labor requirements are a function
of the scale of an industry's operations; for the scale expands, as does output,
at 'a decelerating rate.
28of a series of gradual changes from stage to stage, but of
tsingleabrupt change from a very rapid rate of decline
luring the first stages of growth to a moderate rate persist-
.ng without any or with only little change during the rest
)f the industry's career. That is, the shape of an industry's
Labor-output curve could be reasonably approximated by
:wo connected straight lines, the first (with a sharp negative
;lope) covering the early life of the industry, and the second
(with a mild negative slope) covering the later, and major
portion. If this is the situation, then the phenomenon, of
deceleration would hardly be observable in available data,
which seldom cover the very early years of an industry's
career, and in any case would possess little significance.
Again, gradual deceleration might definitely exist but at
low rate. The most prominent feature of the long-run
changes in an industry's unit labor requirements, certainly
for a period as short as that 1899,wouldthen be long
cycles or erratic movements rather than deceleration, for
four decades is hardly a long time in the life of many in-
dustries.
A pulsating rate of decline in unit labor requirements
might well be expected: startling innovations are not intro-
duced every year, although minor improvements in tech-
niques may be made almost continuously. It is interesting
to speculate also on ,the possibility that long cycles in unit
labor requirements in different industries more or less
synchronize. This. concurrence might arise from general
waves of rationalization (such as many economists believe
occurred during the 'twenties), extensive changes in .the
working week and in labor relations, generally high levels
of output and capital investment, and so forth.
There islittle point in pressing these speculations
further. From the data gathered in this study we cannot say
whether there has been any particular pattern, or even. any
pattern at all, of change in the labor-output ratio during
the life of an industry: the period covered is relatively short
29and data on actual hours worked in individual
are inadequate.
Whatever the pattern of decline in unit labor require
ments, the course plotted for employment in individual
industries rests securely on the data sampled in Chart 5
There one can see clearly that the industrial distribution
of employment is in continual flux. Change in aggregate
employment is the net result of the shift of workers intc
new industries, the rapid multiplication of jobs in the
young industries that survive in the initial struggle foi
breathing space, the moderate growth (but from a higher
level) of industries close to maturity, the stagnation in older
industries, the decline in waning industries, and finally the
disappearance of employment in industries that are leaving
the economic scene.
Technological changes—and allt the other factors apart
from technology popularly subsumed under them—play a
significant role in these trends. They are basic not only to
the ebb of employment in mature and decadent industries
but also to the appearance and growth of new fields of em-
ployment. Technological evolution is a factor in the hiring
of workers as well as in their firing. But the relationships
involved are far from simple. Even when employment in an
industry is contracting, and its technological level is rising
at the same time, we cannot always state unequivocally that
technological development is the factor responsible for
fewer jobs. For example, in the cigar industry production
was 20 per cent less in 1937 than in 1929, and aggregate
manhours worked, 52 per cent, but because of a shorter
working week only 33 per cent fewer workers were em-
ployed. Output per worker rose 20 per cent and output pet
manhour 66 per cent. Can we say that this gain in pro-
ductivity led to an equivalent labor displacement? Is it not
possible that output, and with it, employment, might• have
fallen still more had mechanization not been instituted and
costs and prices cut? All this is not to deny that the trend
30of employment is downward in many industries and that a
painful process of adjustmeht is continually going on. Yet
technological unemp]oymeiit, i.e., the fraction of total un-
employment that may be ascribed to a particular set of the
several sets of factors making for unemployment, remains
so complex and theoretical that it can scarcely be estimated
with existing statistics.
Capital investment, if it carl be considered apart from
developments in technology, also has played two roles in
opening up employment opportunities and in their indus-
trial distribution. On the one hand, it is unlikely that an
industry (and the employment it offers) has expanded with-
out an influx of capital into it, and that aggregate assets in
industries with shrinking output and employment have in-
creased. Undoubtedly there have been exceptions. Since
pouring capital into an industry is only one of the means by
which its output is augmented, some industries may have
grown with little or no increase, or even a decrease, in their
capital assets; and it is conceivable that capital assets, by
displacing other factors of production, have grown even in
some decadent industries. Nevertheless, what we know of
industrial history bears out our observation. Between 1904
and1937 the largest increases in jobs were in the major
groups of manufacturing industries whose fixed assets, in
terms of net book values, increased most rapidly. The auto-
mobile, chemical and rubber products groups stand out in
this respect. And among the groups with relatively slight
increases in employment—notably tobacco, leather, and for-
est products—are the industries with less-than-average jncre-
ments to capital assets.16
16Netbook values are not the only measures of capital invested, of course,
but almost any accepted measures would yield results consistent with the
remarks in the text.
These observations apply to changes in aggregate capital assets, not capital
assets per worker. Accessible data on capital investment are not to be relied
upon for information on the latter; and alternative measures based on these
data would probably yield results at variance with one another.
3'On the other hand, reduction in labor per unit has usually
been a concomitant of the inflow of capital. Inevitably,
then? when output failsto expand sufficiently to bal-
ance the decline in labor per nnit, new capital investment is
associated with fewer jobs. Here, also, we see that change
in the employment offered by an industry corresponds in
direction with change in capital investmept or in some
other related factor at certain stages of an industry and not
at other stages. Though adequate statistical information is
lacking, it seems likely, that in the early stages of an industry
capital investment is accompanied by more jobs; that in the
mature phases it may be, by static or declining
employment (though at this stage improvements incapi-
tal equipment used lOT replacement, rather than net addi-
tions to the capital stock, may constitute the .basis for
techpplogical advance); and that, in the declining stage dis-
investment of capital parallel displacement of labor.
To be sure, the stagcs of growth do not always follow the
pattern of adolescence, maturity, and decline. Sometimes an
industry gets a flew lease on life. A technological innovation
of scope may lead to so great a cut in costs
and prices that output jumps and with it employment. Or
a spurt in demand may be the responsible factor, as, when
new uses suddenly appear for an old product. In an industry
so affected, new capital investment may become associated
with an ascending rather than a trend in em-




Thegreat reduction since 1899 in the factory labor utilized
per unit of output—one-half in terms of workers, two-thirds
in terms of manhours—means a very substantial gain in fac-
tory productivity, that is, in the power and efficiency with
which manufacturing industry 'has applied itself to turning
out goods. These figures, or rather the corresponding ad-
32vances in output per worker or per manhour, are not, of
course, exact measures of the gain in productivity. Shifts in
the ratio between output and labor input may come about
through the substitution of other production factors for
workers, or of one type of labor for another; and these sub-
stitutions must be allowed for in any attempt to measure
changes in productivity by shifts in the ratio. For example, if
costs are incurred in the operation and maintenance of the
cigar machines that have displaced cigar makers, or in the
puithase of the electric power that has superseded the fac-
tory production of power, it cannot be said that the entire
reduction in labor per unit is a net gain. On the other hand,
the substitution of unskilled for skilled labor (cigar-machine
operators for hand workers) may signify a gain that is not
reflected in the measnres of labor input we have.17 Similarly,
capital-saving innovations lead to gains not evidenced by the
productivity ratio we can compute. Yet even liberal allow-
ance for such biases would not invalidate the conclusion that
there have been widespread and, on the average, ire-
mendôus strides in the productivity df manufacturing in-
dustries.
These strides, cannot be fully understood or ex-
plained when viewed in isolation, because manufacturing
constitutes, Merely One sector of our economy. Indeed, the
career of any single industry, great or small, is a thread
woven into a complex pattern, to which it contributes its
share of color, texture, and design, and from which it largely
derives its meaning. , I
,
•The labor-output ratio is affçcted by the kind and quality
of the raw and semiprocessed materials an indqstry con-
sumes. Selection of seed and technological advances have
raised the sugar content of beets, with a consequent gain in
17 If the skill of the displaced workers is thereby rendered obsolete, as it often
is, the gain is merely a gross gain (in the accounting sense) from the view-
point of society at large. In casting up its accounts, the nation must give full
consideration to the negative consequences of any industrial development.
88the sugar yield obtained by manufacturers per ton of beets
treated; and the introduction of the flotation process, which
led to the concentration of an increasing fraction of copper
ores by the mining industry, has lessened the effort ex-
pended in the factory to derive a given quantity of copper in
the smelting process. Advances in the processing of steel
sheets in steel works and rolling mills have lessened the work
to be done per unit in automobile body plants; and the new
and better products of the paint and varnish industry have
helped to speed up the production and improve the quality
of many manufactured products.
Similarly, industries supplying equipment have helped
the productivity of other manufacturing industries. Im-
provements in capital equipment have sometimes originated
in the equipment industries themselves, sometimes in the
industries ordering and using the equipment, and fre-
quently in a collaboration between the two groups. And
such forms of nonmanufacturing endeavor as engineering
and independent research have made their contribution to
manufacturing. Even intangibles—such as ideas concerning
organization and management—seldom originate in the in-
dustries utilizing them. They spring up in different areas of
our industry as well as abroad and come to form part of a
commonpooi, drawn upon by all types of enterprise. Indus-
tries consuming the products of other industries have con-
tributed to the progress of the latter. Discoveries of uses by
consuming industries for materials formerly thrown on the
waste heap have swelled the output and enhanced the pro-
ductivity of the producing industries.
Perhaps the stellar role in the contribution of nonmanu-
facturing industries to factory productivity has been played
by transportation. Through the railroad system manufac-
turers have been able to tap new sources of raw materials.
To cite one industry, lumber manufacturers have extended
their operations to virgin forests, thereby at least retarding
increases in their costs. Again, highly concentrated localiza-
34ion of factories, with the fine division of labor and other
.dvantages it implies, depends upon cheap and efficient
ransportation not oniy from sources of supply to factory but
iso among specialist plants. Indeed, it is clear that the im-
nense expansion of the factory system itself went hand in
tand with the extension of the railway.system. Advances in
vater transportation.and in other industries facilitating for-
ign trade have done much to bring materials and machines
.o our factories and open up markets for their products.
The augmented scale on which manufacturing is done in
tself makes for greater factory productivity. The growth of
he economy at large has aided in stepping up the scale of
)perations in manufacturing even more rapidly than in
)ther industries, owing to the emphasis on fabricated goods
.n consumer budgets as incomes have become more ample.
Df course, bigger operations may press upon limited natural
resources and cause the employment of more, rather than
Less, labor per unit of product. There is frequently such a
tendency in mining; and, if demand leads to the exploita-
tion of mines yielding low grades of ore, even manufactur-
ing productivity may be affected adversely. But the evidence
cited in the preceding section suggests that in the past, at
least, greater factory output has not usually been associated
with less output per unit of labor.
Manufacturing has always stood in a reciprocal relation
to the economy at large.. Developments in factories have
been stimulated from the outside and have given impetus
in turn to advances in other sectors of the economy. With
the expansion of manufacturing the scale of operations
in nonmanufacturing industries, and thereby their pro-
ductivity, has risen. Manufacturing industries have further
enhanced the productivity of nonmanufacturing both by
relieving them of work and by giving them better and
cheaper equipment and materials. The substitution of the
factory-made tractor for the farmbred horse, for instance,
35set free the farm labor that formerly went into rearing, feed
itig, and caring fçr draught animals. The railroad industr
has benefited from lighter and stronger freight cars am
locomotives, arid improved fuels.
Since the growth and efficiency of a single industry 0:
groupof industries canhot be treated apart from the prog
ress of the entire system, we must• view the increase ir
output per unit of labor in manufacturing as merely ori
observation on the change in the productivity of the entir
écoi-iomy; and not oniy the growth but also the stagnatior
of factory employment falls into perspective as an aspect 0:
our 'general economic advance.
The indexes of employment are based, for Census years, on the data collected in thi
Census of Manufactures; for intercensal years, on samples collected by several states am
by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics—for i8gg—igtg see P. H. Douglas, Real Wage.
in the United States, 1890—1926(HoughtonMuffin, 1930),pp.438-9, and for 1919—41
seethe mimeographed summary prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The index,e
of total employment cover proprietors and salaried workers as welt as wage earners. I
is not known to what extent the employment figures for years preceding includi
the workers mentioned in footnotes a, b, and c.
The indexes of aggregate manhours worked by wage earners per unit of product equa
the index of wage earners per unit of product multiplied by indexes of hours. Th
latter were derived as follows: Estimate A—the National Industrial Conference Boarc
series for 1914and192&-40(releasedin various publications of the Board) and estimate:
for other years computed by extrapolating the N.LC.B. 1920figureby the Dougla:
series on full-time hours (op. cit., p. iaô); Estimate B—the Witt Bowden series for igog
1914,1919, and1923—32(MonthlyLabor Review, Sept. 1940),theB.L.S. series of actua
hours for 1952—40(MonthlyLabor Review), and estimates for other years computed
extrapolating the Bowden 1923figureby the Douglas series. The Douglas seriesi:
based on data collected by the U. 5. Commissioner of Labor and the U. S. Bureau ol
Labor Statistics.
a The index of total employment for 1935, including factory workers engaged in 4is
tribution, is 174;perunit of product, the index is 58.
b The index of total employment fori including factory workers -notreported it
regular categories, is per unit of product, the index is
c The index of total for includingfactory workers engaged wholli
or chiefly in distribution, construction, and other manufacturing activities, is pci
unit of' product, the index is 52.
cil'he Federal Reserve index of factory output, by which our index, was extrapo
lated, is an estimate involving certain assumptions concerning changes in manhours
unit of product. For this reason the 1940figureson output (to some extent) and ox
employment per unit of product and manhours per unit of product (to a rather largi
extent) •areto be considered as merely rough preliminaiy estimates.TABLE1
All Manufacturing industries Combined
indexes of Production, Employment, and Employment
and Manhours per Unit of Product (1899:ioo)
NUMBER
NUMBEREMPLOYEE) EMPLOYED PER UNIT OF PRODUCT
PHYSICAL Wage MI Wage All Aggregate wage
OUTPUT earnersworkers earnersworkersearner hours
Est. Est.
A 13
IOU IOU lOt) IOU 100
I0() 102 J04 101
1901 115 109 94
1Q02 129 ItS 9!
1Q03 132 122 93 91




igo8 133 124 94
1909 139 143 88 go 85
1910 i58 145
1911 i6i 145 90
1912 151 St
1913 ig8 152 77
1914 i86 14€ 152 79 73 73
1915 218 '55 70
igib 259 179
1917 257 191 74
igi8 254 '95 77 70
1919 222 i88 84 8g 74
1920 242 188 78
1921 194 144 152 74 78 6o
1922 249 i6o 64 56
1923 280 183 190 68 57
1Q24 266 $70 64 54 53
1925 298 175 183 59 6i 51 50
1926 316 179 57 49 48
1927 317 175 184 55 47
1928 332 175 53 45 44
1929 364 i8y 197 51 54 44 43
1930 311 162 52 41 41
1931 262 137 52 38 40
1Q32 197 117 59 37 41
1933 228 57 59 37 39
1Q84 252 151
1935 301 160 167a 55a
353 174 49 35 35
376 191 1Q81) 51 36
295 160 54 33 35
374 '76 i8ic 47 480 32 32
429 190 44 3° 8'
souRcEs:Theindex ofoutput for 1899—1937 was takenfrom TheOutput of Manufac-
turing Industries, 1899—1937(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940), p. 44,
and extended by a preliminary index derived by the National Bureau from data in the
'9S9 Census of Manufactures, with estimates for and1940 based on the Federa1
Reserve index as given in current issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Sources and notes continued on rage 36.
37TABLE 2
Individual Manufacturing Industries
Percentage Changes in Physical Output, Number of Wage
Earners, and Wage Earners per Unit of Product, 1899—1937
WAGE EARNERS
PHYSICAL WAGE PER UNIT
INDUSTRY OUTPUT EARNERS OF PRODUCT
(percentage change, 1899—1937)
Foods
Meat packing 66 85 12
Flour —8 —18 —10
Rice 416 241 —34
Fish, canned g6 46 —26
Fruits & vegetables, canned 792 213 —65
Butter, cheese, & canned milk 460 '57 —54
Beet sugar 1,690 375 —73
Cane sugar 86 29 —30
Ice 668 173 —64
Beverages
Liquors, malt 6o '9 —26
Liquors, distilled 315 '53 —39
Tobacco products
Cigarettes & cigars 454 —19 —86
Chewing & smoking tobacco —6 —65
Textile products
Cotton goods ioi 42 —30
Woolen& worsted goods 6o 25 —22
Silk&rayongoods 512 79 —71
Knitgoods 177 —54
Carpets & rugs, wool 52 8 —29
Cordage & twine —22
Jute goods 134 45 —38
Linen goods —44 —43 0.3
Hats, fur-felt 26 —i6
Hats,wool-felt 90 92 2
Leather products
Leather 6t —3 —40
Shoes 87 52 —19
Gloves 29 —3 —25
Paper products
Pulp & paper 518 177 —55
Printing & publishing
Printing& publishing, total 494 78 —70WAGE EARNERS
PHYSICAL WAGE PER UNIT
INDUSTRY OUTPUT EARNERS OF PRODUCT
(percentage change, 1899—i937)
Chemical products
Chemicals, industrial, md. gases,
compressed, & rayon 2,500 693 —70
Cottonseed products 51 —8
Wood distillation products 259 184 —21
Explosives 267 20 —67
Fertilizers 248 80 —48
Paints& varnishes 391 228 —33
82 —3 —47
Tanning & dye materials 292 71 —56
Petroleum & coal products
Petroleum refining i .920 583 —66
Coke-oven products 380 21 —75
Forest products
Lumber-mill products —32 —20 19
Turpentine & rosin —32 —22 15
Iron & steel products
Blast-furnace products 171 —4.1 —78
Steel-mill products 313 162 —36
Nonferrous-metal products
Copper 272 28 —66
Lead 5' —5' —68
Zinc 318 132 —45
Transportation equipment
Automobiles, md. bodies Sc partsi8o,ooo 21,300 —88
Carriages, wagons & sleighs —g6
Cars, railroad —22 9 39
Locomotives —79 —53 126
Ships & boats —17 33
SOURCES: The figures on output are from The Output of Manufacturing
Industries, 189ç,e—1937 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940), pp.
106-7, except the index for leather gloves, which has been revised; the
changes in number of wage earners, from the Census of Manufactures. The
industry titles are not the full Census titles; for the full titles see the volume
cited. industry called 'chewing and smoking tobacco' above is called
other tobacco products' in this volume.
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